EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN ANTITRUST: DOES EC MERGER POLICY GENERATE DETERRENCE?

Joseph A. Clougherty, Tomaso Duso, Miyu Lee, Jo Seldeslachts

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as—unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions—phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries, that is, industries where the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries. (JEL K21, K40, L40).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1884-1903
Number of pages20
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume54
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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