Effects of corporate lobbying on Chief Executive Officer remuneration and corporate performance

Ana Jeniffer Rebouças Maia, Alan Diógenes Góis, Marcia Martins Mendes de Luca, Gerlando Augusto Sampaio Franco Lima

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


According to the Theory of Economic Regulation, corporate lobbying is a productive investment for firms looking to influence legislation and public policy. Corporate political activity can generate benefits for the organization; however, in the presence of agency conflicts the advantage is often offset by agency costs borne by the shareholders. Sometimes excess remuneration is offered by the principal in exchange for the agent’s commitment to shareholder wealth creation. In this study we evaluated the association between corporate lobbying, chief executive officer remuneration and corporate performance in 238 firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange, covering the period 2014-2017. Our regression analyses reveal that corporate lobbying is positively associated with chief executive officer remuneration and negatively associated with corporate performance, suggesting the existence of agency costs resulting from corporate lobbying. In such scenarios, based on our sample, corporate lobbying does not improve performance or generate benefits for shareholders, but serves as a personal and political tool for executive self-promotion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numbere186880
JournalRevista de Contabilidade e Organizacoes
StatePublished - Feb 18 2022


  • Agency Theory
  • Chief Executive Officer remuneration
  • Corporate lobbying
  • Corporate performance
  • Theory of Economic Regulation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Education
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation


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