TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamic tournament design
T2 - Evidence from prediction contests
AU - Lemus, Jorge
AU - Marshall, Guillermo
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/2
Y1 - 2021/2
N2 - Online contests have become a prominent form of innovation procurement. Contest platforms often display a real-time public leaderboard to provide performance feedback. The impact of information disclosure on players’ decisions is theoretically ambiguous: some players may get discouraged and quit, while others may decide to keep working to remain competitive. We investigate the impact of a leaderboard on contest outcomes using two complementary approaches. First, we estimate a dynamic model using observational data and compare the equilibria with and without a leaderboard. Second, we present experimental evidence from student competitions. We find that a leaderboard on average improves competition outcomes.
AB - Online contests have become a prominent form of innovation procurement. Contest platforms often display a real-time public leaderboard to provide performance feedback. The impact of information disclosure on players’ decisions is theoretically ambiguous: some players may get discouraged and quit, while others may decide to keep working to remain competitive. We investigate the impact of a leaderboard on contest outcomes using two complementary approaches. First, we estimate a dynamic model using observational data and compare the equilibria with and without a leaderboard. Second, we present experimental evidence from student competitions. We find that a leaderboard on average improves competition outcomes.
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U2 - 10.1086/711762
DO - 10.1086/711762
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85099603615
SN - 0022-3808
VL - 129
SP - 383
EP - 420
JO - Journal of Political Economy
JF - Journal of Political Economy
IS - 2
ER -