Dynamic tournament design: Evidence from prediction contests

Jorge Lemus, Guillermo Marshall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Online contests have become a prominent form of innovation procurement. Contest platforms often display a real-time public leaderboard to provide performance feedback. The impact of information disclosure on players’ decisions is theoretically ambiguous: some players may get discouraged and quit, while others may decide to keep working to remain competitive. We investigate the impact of a leaderboard on contest outcomes using two complementary approaches. First, we estimate a dynamic model using observational data and compare the equilibria with and without a leaderboard. Second, we present experimental evidence from student competitions. We find that a leaderboard on average improves competition outcomes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)383-420
Number of pages38
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Issue number2
StatePublished - Feb 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Dynamic tournament design: Evidence from prediction contests'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this