Dynamic Task Pricing in Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing with Markov Correlated Equilibrium

Haiming Jin, Hongpeng Guo, Lu Su, Klara Nahrstedt, Xinbing Wang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The recent proliferation of human-carried mobile devices has given rise to mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems, where a myriad of data requesters outsource their sensing tasks to a crowd of workers via a cloud-based platform. In order to incentivize participation, requesters typically compensate workers with specific amount of payments. Clearly, setting an appropriate task price is critical for a requester to attract enough worker participation without unnecessary expenses. Therefore, we investigate the problem of task pricing in MCS systems with multi-requester price competition, and also dynamically arriving workers. Task pricing in such scenario is challenging, because of each requester's incomplete information about the others, uncertainty of future information, etc. So as to address these challenges, we use Markov game to model requesters' competitive task pricing, and Markov correlated equilibrium (MCE) as the solution concept. We propose that the platform uses the social cost-minimizing MCE to coordinate requesters' prices, which is self-enforcing, and optimizes the system-wide objective of social cost. Technically, we propose a computationally efficient algorithm to compute an approximately optimal MCE. Furthermore, through extensive performance evaluation, we show numerically that our algorithm yields close-to-minimum social cost in very short running time.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationINFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1063-1071
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781728105154
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2019
Event2019 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2019 - Paris, France
Duration: Apr 29 2019May 2 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Volume2019-April
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Conference

Conference2019 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2019
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period4/29/195/2/19

Fingerprint

Costs
Mobile devices
Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Jin, H., Guo, H., Su, L., Nahrstedt, K., & Wang, X. (2019). Dynamic Task Pricing in Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing with Markov Correlated Equilibrium. In INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (pp. 1063-1071). [8737506] (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM; Vol. 2019-April). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737506

Dynamic Task Pricing in Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing with Markov Correlated Equilibrium. / Jin, Haiming; Guo, Hongpeng; Su, Lu; Nahrstedt, Klara; Wang, Xinbing.

INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 1063-1071 8737506 (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM; Vol. 2019-April).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Jin, H, Guo, H, Su, L, Nahrstedt, K & Wang, X 2019, Dynamic Task Pricing in Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing with Markov Correlated Equilibrium. in INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications., 8737506, Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM, vol. 2019-April, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1063-1071, 2019 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2019, Paris, France, 4/29/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737506
Jin H, Guo H, Su L, Nahrstedt K, Wang X. Dynamic Task Pricing in Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing with Markov Correlated Equilibrium. In INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. p. 1063-1071. 8737506. (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM). https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2019.8737506
Jin, Haiming ; Guo, Hongpeng ; Su, Lu ; Nahrstedt, Klara ; Wang, Xinbing. / Dynamic Task Pricing in Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing with Markov Correlated Equilibrium. INFOCOM 2019 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. pp. 1063-1071 (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM).
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