Dynamic lobbying conflicts

Mattias K. Polborn, Zaruhi Sahakyan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper analyzes a dynamic lobbying model in which two antagonistic lobbies compete with each other for a prize over two time periods that are linked through status quo bias. The attacker has to decide whether to attempt an attack on the status quo already in the first period or whether to wait. We identify how the attacker's behavior in the dynamic model differs from that in a comparable static model. Two antagonistic effects are the "option value effect" that is similar to the real option effect in the theory of investment decisions under uncertainty; and a "defender discouragement effect" that often makes change cheaper to achieve than in a comparable static model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)263-279
Number of pages17
JournalEconomics of Governance
Issue number3
StatePublished - May 1 2007


  • Dynamic lobbying
  • Political economy
  • Rent-seeking

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


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