Dont stop believing

Jennifer Rose Carr

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Its been argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality. These arguments come partly in response to certain kinds of counterexamples to Conditionalization, but are mainly motivated by a form of internalism that appears to be in tension with any sort of diachronic coherence requirements. I argue that there are, in fact, fundamentally diachronic norms of rationality. And this is to reject at least a strong version of internalism. But I suggest a replacement for Conditionalization that salvages internalist intuitions, and carves a middle ground between (probabilist versions of) conservatism and evidentialism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)744-766
Number of pages23
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number5-6
StatePublished - Nov 2 2015


  • Epistemology
  • conditionalization
  • diachronic norms
  • evidence
  • evidentialism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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