Do Performance-Contingent Incentives Help or Hinder Divergent Thinking?

Steven J. Kachelmeier, R. Alan Webb, Michael G. Williamson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Toward the goal of reconciling conflicting arguments on whether performance-based incentives facilitate or impede divergent thinking, we identify a feature common to prior demonstrations of negative incentive effects: they generally involve tasks with only one correct solution. Our first experiment replicates a negative incentive effect when insight problems require “bottom-up” divergent thinking from an unexpected resource to the problem it is uniquely equipped to solve, whereas our second experiment finds a positive incentive effect in the more general case of problems that enable “top-down” divergent thinking from a problem to multiple potential solutions. We also observe a positive incentive effect in a third experiment that measures the time needed to generate a solution to problems that have multiple potential solutions and in a fourth experiment in which participants design insight problems. Overall, our findings suggest that any harmful effects of performance-based incentives are likely restricted to highly constrained settings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)229-248
Number of pages20
JournalAccounting Review
Volume99
Issue number2
Early online dateFeb 5 2024
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2024

Keywords

  • creativity
  • divergent thinking
  • incentives
  • insight problems
  • top-down versus bottom-up reasoning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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