TY - GEN
T1 - Distributed vehicle-target assignment using learning in games
AU - Arslan, Gürdal
AU - Shamma, Jeff S.
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - We consider an autonomous vehicle-target assignment problem where a group of vehicles are expected to optimally assign themselves to a set of targets. We introduce a game theoretical formulation of the problem in which the vehicles are viewed as self-interested decision makers. Thus, we seek the optimization of a global utility function through autonomous vehicles that are capable of making individually rational decisions to optimize their own utility functions. The first important aspect of the problem is to choose the utility functions of the vehicles in such a way that the objectives of the vehicles are localized to each vehicle yet aligned with a global utility function. The second important aspect of the problem is to equip the vehicles with an appropriate negotiation mechanism by which each vehicle pursues the optimization of its own utility function. We propose algorithms from multiplayer learning in games as such negotiation mechanisms. We show that convergence of negotiations to an optimal assignment is generally possible provided that the utilities of the vehicles are designed appropriately. Finally, by extensive simulations, we illustrate that vehicle negotiations can consistently lead to near optimal assignments.
AB - We consider an autonomous vehicle-target assignment problem where a group of vehicles are expected to optimally assign themselves to a set of targets. We introduce a game theoretical formulation of the problem in which the vehicles are viewed as self-interested decision makers. Thus, we seek the optimization of a global utility function through autonomous vehicles that are capable of making individually rational decisions to optimize their own utility functions. The first important aspect of the problem is to choose the utility functions of the vehicles in such a way that the objectives of the vehicles are localized to each vehicle yet aligned with a global utility function. The second important aspect of the problem is to equip the vehicles with an appropriate negotiation mechanism by which each vehicle pursues the optimization of its own utility function. We propose algorithms from multiplayer learning in games as such negotiation mechanisms. We show that convergence of negotiations to an optimal assignment is generally possible provided that the utilities of the vehicles are designed appropriately. Finally, by extensive simulations, we illustrate that vehicle negotiations can consistently lead to near optimal assignments.
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U2 - 10.1109/cdc.2006.376682
DO - 10.1109/cdc.2006.376682
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:39649095838
SN - 1424401712
SN - 9781424401710
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SP - 2837
EP - 2842
BT - Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2006, CDC
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2006, CDC
Y2 - 13 December 2006 through 15 December 2006
ER -