TY - GEN
T1 - Discrete-time LQG mean field games with unreliable communication
AU - Moon, Jun
AU - Basar, Tamer
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 IEEE.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - In this paper, we consider discrete-time linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean field games over unreliable communication links. These are dynamic games with a large number of agents where the cost function of each agent is coupled with other agents' states via a mean field term. Further, the individual dynamical system for each agent is subject to packet dropping. Under this setup, we first obtain an optimal decentralized control law for each agent that is a function of local information as well as packet drop information. We then construct a mean field system that provides the best approximation to the mean field term under appropriate conditions. We also show that the optimal decentralized controller stabilizes the individual dynamical system in the time-average sense. We prove an ε-Nash equilibrium property of the set of N optimal decentralized controllers, and show that ε can be made arbitrarily small as the number of agents becomes arbitrarily large. We note that the existence of the ε-Nash equilibrium obtained in this paper is primarily dependent on the underlying communication networks.
AB - In this paper, we consider discrete-time linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean field games over unreliable communication links. These are dynamic games with a large number of agents where the cost function of each agent is coupled with other agents' states via a mean field term. Further, the individual dynamical system for each agent is subject to packet dropping. Under this setup, we first obtain an optimal decentralized control law for each agent that is a function of local information as well as packet drop information. We then construct a mean field system that provides the best approximation to the mean field term under appropriate conditions. We also show that the optimal decentralized controller stabilizes the individual dynamical system in the time-average sense. We prove an ε-Nash equilibrium property of the set of N optimal decentralized controllers, and show that ε can be made arbitrarily small as the number of agents becomes arbitrarily large. We note that the existence of the ε-Nash equilibrium obtained in this paper is primarily dependent on the underlying communication networks.
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U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2014.7039802
DO - 10.1109/CDC.2014.7039802
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84988273345
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SP - 2697
EP - 2702
BT - 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,CDC 2014
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014
Y2 - 15 December 2014 through 17 December 2014
ER -