TY - GEN
T1 - Detectability of Intermittent Zero-Dynamics Attack in Networked Control Systems
AU - Mao, Yanbing
AU - Jafarnejadsani, Hamidreza
AU - Zhao, Pan
AU - Akyol, Emrah
AU - Hovakimyan, Naira
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.
PY - 2019/12
Y1 - 2019/12
N2 - This paper analyzes stealthy attacks, particularly the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) in networked control systems. ZDA hides the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it cannot be detected via conventional detection methods. A natural defense strategy builds on changing the null-space via switching through a set of topologies. In this paper, we propose a realistic ZDA variation where the attacker is aware of this topology-switching strategy, and hence employs the policy to avoid detection: pause (update and resume) attack before (after) topology switching to evade detection. We first systematically study the proposed ZDA variation, and then develop defense strategies under the realistic assumptions. Particularly, we characterize conditions for detectability of the proposed ZDA variation, in terms of the network topologies to be maintained, the set of agents to be monitored, and the measurements of the monitored agents that should be extracted. We provide numerical results that demonstrate our theoretical findings.
AB - This paper analyzes stealthy attacks, particularly the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) in networked control systems. ZDA hides the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it cannot be detected via conventional detection methods. A natural defense strategy builds on changing the null-space via switching through a set of topologies. In this paper, we propose a realistic ZDA variation where the attacker is aware of this topology-switching strategy, and hence employs the policy to avoid detection: pause (update and resume) attack before (after) topology switching to evade detection. We first systematically study the proposed ZDA variation, and then develop defense strategies under the realistic assumptions. Particularly, we characterize conditions for detectability of the proposed ZDA variation, in terms of the network topologies to be maintained, the set of agents to be monitored, and the measurements of the monitored agents that should be extracted. We provide numerical results that demonstrate our theoretical findings.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85082484829&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/CDC40024.2019.9029997
DO - 10.1109/CDC40024.2019.9029997
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85082484829
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SP - 5605
EP - 5610
BT - 2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2019
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 58th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2019
Y2 - 11 December 2019 through 13 December 2019
ER -