Most malicious attacks compromise system security through memory corruption exploits. Recently proposed techniques attempt to defeat these attacks by protecting program control data. We have constructed a new class of attacks that can compromise network applications without tampering with any control data. These non-control data attacks represent a new challenge to system security. In this paper, we propose an architectural technique to defeat both control data and non-control data attacks based on the notion of pointer taintedness. A pointer is said to be tainted if user input can be used as the pointer value. A security attack is detected whenever a tainted value is dereferenced during program execution. The proposed architecture is implemented on the SimpleScalar processor simulator and is evaluated using synthetic programs as well as real-world network applications. Our technique can effectively detect both control data and non-control data attacks, and it offers better security coverage than current methods. The proposed architecture is transparent to existing programs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2005
Event2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Yokohama, Japan
Duration: Jun 28 2005Jul 1 2005


Other2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks


  • Attack
  • Hardware Design
  • Security
  • Taintedness
  • Vulnerability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications


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