Abstract
Chandra Sripada's (2010) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in people's judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agent's active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agent's deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in people's intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions-a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada & Konrath, 2011). In this article, we show that the Deep Self Concordance Account, as it is currently articulated, is unacceptable.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 629-646 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
Volume | 25 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 2012 |
Keywords
- Causal Modeling
- Deep Self
- Experimental Philosophy
- Harm and Help Cases
- Intentional Action
- Knobe
- Sripada
- Structural Equation Modeling
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Applied Psychology
- Philosophy