Deep trouble for the deep self

David Rose, Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Edouard Machery

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Chandra Sripada's (2010) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in people's judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agent's active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agent's deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in people's intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions-a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada & Konrath, 2011). In this article, we show that the Deep Self Concordance Account, as it is currently articulated, is unacceptable.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)629-646
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Issue number5
StatePublished - Oct 2012


  • Causal Modeling
  • Deep Self
  • Experimental Philosophy
  • Harm and Help Cases
  • Intentional Action
  • Knobe
  • Sripada
  • Structural Equation Modeling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Philosophy


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