Deceptive routing games

Quanyan Zhu, Andrew Clark, Radha Poovendran, M Tamer Basar

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Abstract

The use of a shared medium leaves wireless networks, including mobile ad hoc and sensor networks, vulnerable to jamming attacks. In this paper, we introduce a jamming defense mechanism for multiple-path routing networks based on maintaining deceptive flows, consisting of fake packets, between a source and a destination. An adversary observing a deceptive flow will expend energy on disrupting the fake packets, allowing the real data packets to arrive at the destination unharmed. We model this deceptive flow-based defense within a multi-stage stochastic game framework between the network nodes, which choose a routing path and flow rates for the real and fake data, and an adversary, which chooses which fraction of each flow to target at each hop. We develop an efficient, distributed procedure for computing the optimal routing at each hop and the optimal flow allocation at the destination. Furthermore, by studying the equilibria of the game, we quantify the benefit arising from deception, as reflected in an increase in the valid throughput. Our results are demonstrated via a simulation study.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6426515
Pages (from-to)2704-2711
Number of pages8
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2012
Event51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012 - Maui, HI, United States
Duration: Dec 10 2012Dec 13 2012

Fingerprint

Jamming
Routing
Game
Network routing
Mobile ad hoc networks
Sensor networks
Wireless networks
Flow rate
Throughput
Choose
Deception
Path
Stochastic Games
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Flow Rate
Sensor Networks
Wireless Networks
Quantify
Attack
Simulation Study

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Deceptive routing games. / Zhu, Quanyan; Clark, Andrew; Poovendran, Radha; Basar, M Tamer.

In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 01.12.2012, p. 2704-2711.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Zhu, Quanyan ; Clark, Andrew ; Poovendran, Radha ; Basar, M Tamer. / Deceptive routing games. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. 2012 ; pp. 2704-2711.
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