Deceptive Multi-dimensional Information Disclosure over a Gaussian Channel∗

Muhammed O. Sayin, Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We analyze deceptive multi-dimensional information disclosure over a channel between an information provider and a decision maker. The information provider has access to noisy versions of an underlying information. Different from the classical communication models, the provider has a different (hidden) objective while he/she must still honestly and transparently provide the information for his/her reputation. However, how well the provider has access to the information is private to him/her. We address how he/she can exploit this asymmetry according to his/her deceptive goal by modeling the interaction as a Stackelberg game, where the information provider is the leader. With quadratic objective functions, multi-variate Gaussian information and additive Gaussian noise channel, we analytically formulate the optimal linear deception strategy and the corresponding optimal decision strategy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages6545-6552
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781538654286
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 9 2018
Event2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018 - Milwauke, United States
Duration: Jun 27 2018Jun 29 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
Volume2018-June
ISSN (Print)0743-1619

Other

Other2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018
CountryUnited States
CityMilwauke
Period6/27/186/29/18

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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