Decentralized network resource allocation as a repeated noncooperative market game

Rajiv T. Maheswaran, Tamer Basar

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Abstract

Market-based methods are an emerging paradigm for controlling large decentralized systems. We introduce in this paper a bidding mechanism for allocation of network resources among competing agents, and study it from a game-theoretic perspective. We prove the existence and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and present an update algorithm that allows users to converge to the Nash equilibrium in a decentralized manner using feedback of only the common information available to the resource. The necessary conditions for local stability of relaxed versions of the algorithm are derived and verified by simulations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)4565-4570
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume5
StatePublished - Dec 1 2001
Event40th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) - Orlando, FL, United States
Duration: Dec 4 2001Dec 7 2001

Fingerprint

Nash Equilibrium
Resource Allocation
Decentralized
Resource allocation
Game
Resources
Bidding
Local Stability
Uniqueness
Update
Paradigm
Converge
Feedback
Necessary Conditions
Simulation
Market

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Decentralized network resource allocation as a repeated noncooperative market game. / Maheswaran, Rajiv T.; Basar, Tamer.

In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Vol. 5, 01.12.2001, p. 4565-4570.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

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