Debunking material induction

Jonathan Livengood, Daniel Z. Korman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper, we present an explanatory objection to Norton's material theory of induction, as applied to predictive inferences. According to the objection we present, there is an explanatory disconnect between our beliefs about the future and the relevant future facts. We argue that if we recognize such a disconnect, we are no longer rationally entitled to our future beliefs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)20-27
Number of pages8
JournalStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
StatePublished - Dec 2020


  • Debunking
  • Explanatory constraint
  • Induction
  • Material theory
  • Norton

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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