TY - GEN
T1 - Dandelion++
T2 - 2018 ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, SIGMETRICS 2018
AU - Fanti, Giulia
AU - Denby, Bradley
AU - Venkatakrishnan, Shaileshh Bojja
AU - Bhargava, Shruti
AU - Viswanath, Pramod
AU - Bakshi, Surya
AU - Miller, Andrew
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
PY - 2018/6/12
Y1 - 2018/6/12
N2 - Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin’s networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to link transactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundwork for low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we present Dandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymization attacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ builds upon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However, in this paper, we highlight some simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and show how they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. In contrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed to disobey protocol. Dandelion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completely interoperable with the existing Bitcoin network. We evaluate it through experiments on Bitcoin’s mainnet (i.e., the live Bitcoin network) to demonstrate its interoperability and low broadcast latency overhead.
AB - Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin’s networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to link transactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundwork for low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we present Dandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymization attacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ builds upon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However, in this paper, we highlight some simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and show how they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. In contrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed to disobey protocol. Dandelion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completely interoperable with the existing Bitcoin network. We evaluate it through experiments on Bitcoin’s mainnet (i.e., the live Bitcoin network) to demonstrate its interoperability and low broadcast latency overhead.
KW - Anonymity
KW - Cryptocurrencies
KW - P2P networks
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85052026281&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85052026281&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3219617.3219620
DO - 10.1145/3219617.3219620
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85052026281
T3 - SIGMETRICS 2018 - Abstracts of the 2018 ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems
SP - 5
EP - 7
BT - SIGMETRICS 2018 - Abstracts of the 2018 ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 18 June 2018 through 22 June 2018
ER -