Abstract
Corporate and securities laws are seen as mitigating corporate fraud by manipulating the incentives of agents: presenting corporate agents with a probability of being caught and punished if they commit fraud. This Article suggests that the same laws also affect corporate fraud in a significant but unappreciated manner, by manipulating the perceptions of the principals: affecting the principals' efforts in monitoring the agents by making them perceive the risk of fraud as more or less likely.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-33 |
Number of pages | 33 |
Journal | Yale journal on regulation |
Volume | 25 |
Issue number | 1 |
State | Published - Feb 1 2008 |
Keywords
- optimal deterrence
- optimal enforcement
- cognitive bias
- behavioral law & economics
- corporate fraud
- Monetary policy
- central bank