Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Corporate and securities laws are seen as mitigating corporate fraud by manipulating the incentives of agents: presenting corporate agents with a probability of being caught and punished if they commit fraud. This Article suggests that the same laws also affect corporate fraud in a significant but unappreciated manner, by manipulating the perceptions of the principals: affecting the principals' efforts in monitoring the agents by making them perceive the risk of fraud as more or less likely.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-33
Number of pages33
JournalYale journal on regulation
Volume25
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 1 2008

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fraud
Law
incentive
monitoring

Keywords

  • optimal deterrence
  • optimal enforcement
  • cognitive bias
  • behavioral law & economics
  • corporate fraud
  • Monetary policy
  • central bank

Cite this

Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law. / Aviram, Amitai.

In: Yale journal on regulation, Vol. 25, No. 1, 01.02.2008, p. 1-33.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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KW - Monetary policy

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