Could God Have More Than One Nature?

I begin by examining John Hick's view of the status of the claims of the major world religions about what he calls "the real," in particular his view of the status of the theistic claim that the real is personal, and of the nontheistic claim that the real is not personal. I distinguish moderate pluralism, the view that different conceptions of the real are conceptions of the same thing, from radical pluralism, the view that different conceptions all accurately describe the real. Although there is a bit of uncertainty about this, Hick seems to espouse a version of moderate pluralism, a version which I call noumenal pluralism. Moderate pluralism is a coherent view, but radical pluralism is not coherent, and the standard defenses of it are not convincing. However, the view that the real has more than one nature, a view which preserves much of radical pluralism, seems to be coherent.