Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

Stefan Krasa; Wayne Shafer

doi:10.1007/PL00004194

Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

Stefan Krasa, Wayne Shafer

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economics converge to complete information. Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	451-471
Number of pages	21
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	18
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004194
State	Published - 2001

Keywords

Core
Differential information

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Online availability

10.1007/PL00004194

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Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Online availability

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