Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

Stefan Krasa, Wayne Shafer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economics converge to complete information. Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)451-471
Number of pages21
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume18
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2001

Keywords

  • Core
  • Differential information

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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