Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems

Seyed Rasoul Etesami; Sadegh Bolouki; Angelia Nedic; Tamer Basar

doi:10.1109/CDC.2016.7798945

Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems

Seyed Rasoul Etesami, Sadegh Bolouki, Angelia Nedic, Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a reputation system, where a number of individuals express their opinions, modeled by discrete scalars in the interval [0,1], about an object and the object's score (reputation) is determined as the arithmetic mean of all expressed opinions. An individual's expressed opinion may or may not be consistent with her actual opinion, a continuous scalar in [0,1], for a variety of reasons. In this paper, we address in a unified, game-theoretic framework the influence of two opposing social behaviors, namely conformity and manipulation, on the outcome of a reputation system. For the purposes of this paper, conformity as a social behavior refers to the tendency of an individual to express an opinion that matches the public opinion, whereas manipulation refers to the tendency of an individual to express an opinion so as to manipulate the public opinion toward her actual opinion.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	4451-4456
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509018376
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7798945
State	Published - Dec 27 2016
Event	55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 - Las Vegas, United States Duration: Dec 12 2016 → Dec 14 2016

Publication series

Name	2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016

Other

Other	55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
Country/Territory	United States
City	Las Vegas
Period	12/12/16 → 12/14/16

Keywords

Conformity
Nash equilibrium
actual opinion
manipulation
reputation system
virtual opinion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Artificial Intelligence
Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)
Control and Optimization

Online availability

10.1109/CDC.2016.7798945

Library availability

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Cite this

Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems. / Etesami, Seyed Rasoul; Bolouki, Sadegh; Nedic, Angelia et al.
2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 4451-4456 7798945 (2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Etesami, SR, Bolouki, S, Nedic, A & Basar, T 2016, Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems. in 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016., 7798945, 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 4451-4456, 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016, Las Vegas, United States, 12/12/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7798945

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AB - In this paper, we consider a reputation system, where a number of individuals express their opinions, modeled by discrete scalars in the interval [0,1], about an object and the object's score (reputation) is determined as the arithmetic mean of all expressed opinions. An individual's expressed opinion may or may not be consistent with her actual opinion, a continuous scalar in [0,1], for a variety of reasons. In this paper, we address in a unified, game-theoretic framework the influence of two opposing social behaviors, namely conformity and manipulation, on the outcome of a reputation system. For the purposes of this paper, conformity as a social behavior refers to the tendency of an individual to express an opinion that matches the public opinion, whereas manipulation refers to the tendency of an individual to express an opinion so as to manipulate the public opinion toward her actual opinion.

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Conformity versus manipulation in reputation systems

Abstract

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Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Online availability

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