Confiscating flight control system by stealthy output injection attack

Abhishek Dutta, Cedric Langbort

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The problem of designing a false-data injection attack on a model predictive controlled system is considered with 1) limited knowledge of the plant, constraints, and controller characteristics; and 2) the ability to remain undetected by common set-membership-based anomaly detectors. More precisely, it is shown that it is possible for an attacker to estimate a priori the unknown disturbance set and then use this knowledge to masquerade as a disturbance and drive the plant to a desired (by the attacker) target. This attack is illustrated on the linearized longitudinal dynamics of a Boeing 747 benchmark model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)203-213
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Aerospace Information Systems
Issue number4
StatePublished - 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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