TY - JOUR
T1 - Competitive routing in networks with polynomial costs
AU - Altman, Eitan
AU - Başar, Tamer
AU - Jiménez, Tania
AU - Shimkin, Nahum
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received October 19, 1999; revised May 17, 2000 and July 20, 2000. Recommended by Associate Editor L. Dai. The work of E. Altman was supported in part by INRIA/NSF Collaborative Research Grant. The work of T. Bas¸ar was supported in part by Grants NSF INT 98-04950, NSF ANI 98-13710, MURI AF-DC-5-36128, and an ARO/EPRI MURI Grant. E. Altman is with the INRIA, 06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France (e-mail: [email protected]). T. Bas¸ar is with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801-2307 USA. T. Jiménez is with the C.E.S.I.M.O., Universidad de los Andes, Mérida, Venezuela, and INRIA, 06902, Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France. N. Shimkin is with the Electrical Engineering Department, Technion—Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel. Publisher Item Identifier S 0018-9286(02)01093-0.
PY - 2002/1
Y1 - 2002/1
N2 - We study a class of noncooperative general topology networks shared by N users. Each user has a given flow which it has to ship from a source to a destination. We consider a class of polynomial link cost functions adopted originally in the context of road traffic modeling, and show that these costs have appealing properties that lead to predictable and efficient network flows. In particular, we show that the Nash equilibrium is unique, and is moreover efficient. These properties make the polynomial cost structure attractive for traffic regulation and link pricing in telecommunication networks. We finally discuss the computation of the equilibrium in the special case of the affine cost structure for a topology of parallel links.
AB - We study a class of noncooperative general topology networks shared by N users. Each user has a given flow which it has to ship from a source to a destination. We consider a class of polynomial link cost functions adopted originally in the context of road traffic modeling, and show that these costs have appealing properties that lead to predictable and efficient network flows. In particular, we show that the Nash equilibrium is unique, and is moreover efficient. These properties make the polynomial cost structure attractive for traffic regulation and link pricing in telecommunication networks. We finally discuss the computation of the equilibrium in the special case of the affine cost structure for a topology of parallel links.
KW - Networks
KW - Noncooperative equilibria
KW - Nonzero-sum games
KW - Routing
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036248059&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/9.981725
DO - 10.1109/9.981725
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036248059
SN - 0018-9286
VL - 47
SP - 92
EP - 96
JO - IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
JF - IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
IS - 1
ER -