Competition over epidemic networks: Nash and stackelberg games

Zhi Xu, Ali Khanafer, M Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We study the competition over epidemic networks within a game-theoretic framework. Based on the homogeneous n-intertwined Markov model for epidemic spread, we introduce a novel epidemic competition between a network designer and an intelligent adversary, where the designer can protect the network by increasing the curing rate and the adversary, on the contrary, is able to manipulate the infection rate in order to do as much damage as possible. We focus on the case where the underlying graph is fully connected but the analysis can be readily extended to the case of the connected k-regular graph.We fully characterize the Nash solutions and Stackelberg solutions when either the designer or the adversary is the leader, and show that how each player will play in the games will largely depend on the relative costs for protecting and attacking the network.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationACC 2015 - 2015 American Control Conference
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2063-2068
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781479986842
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 28 2015
Event2015 American Control Conference, ACC 2015 - Chicago, United States
Duration: Jul 1 2015Jul 3 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
Volume2015-July
ISSN (Print)0743-1619

Other

Other2015 American Control Conference, ACC 2015
CountryUnited States
CityChicago
Period7/1/157/3/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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