TY - GEN
T1 - Competition in femtocell networks
T2 - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2012
AU - Khanafer, Ali
AU - Saad, Walid
AU - Başar, Tamer
AU - Debbah, Mérouane
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - In emerging small cell wireless, each femtocell access point (FAP) can either service its home subscribers exclusively (i.e., closed access) or open its access to accommodate a number of macrocell users so as to reduce cross-tier interference. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework that enables the FAPs to strategically decide on their uplink access policy. We formulate a noncooperative game in which the FAPs are the players that want to strategically decide on whether to use a closed or an open access policy in order to maximize the performance of their registered users. Each FAP aims at optimizing the tradeoff between reducing cross-tier interference, by admitting macrocell users, and the associated cost in terms of allocated resources. Using novel analytical techniques, we show that the game always admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, despite the discontinuities in the utility functions. Further, we propose a distributed algorithm that can be adopted by the FAPs to reach their equilibrium access policies. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm provides an improvement of 85.4% relative to an optimized open access scheme in the average worst-case FAP utility.
AB - In emerging small cell wireless, each femtocell access point (FAP) can either service its home subscribers exclusively (i.e., closed access) or open its access to accommodate a number of macrocell users so as to reduce cross-tier interference. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework that enables the FAPs to strategically decide on their uplink access policy. We formulate a noncooperative game in which the FAPs are the players that want to strategically decide on whether to use a closed or an open access policy in order to maximize the performance of their registered users. Each FAP aims at optimizing the tradeoff between reducing cross-tier interference, by admitting macrocell users, and the associated cost in terms of allocated resources. Using novel analytical techniques, we show that the game always admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, despite the discontinuities in the utility functions. Further, we propose a distributed algorithm that can be adopted by the FAPs to reach their equilibrium access policies. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm provides an improvement of 85.4% relative to an optimized open access scheme in the average worst-case FAP utility.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84871952711&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84871952711&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICC.2012.6364563
DO - 10.1109/ICC.2012.6364563
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84871952711
SN - 9781457720529
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
SP - 5070
EP - 5074
BT - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2012
Y2 - 10 June 2012 through 15 June 2012
ER -