Communication networks: Pricing, congestion control, routing, and scheduling

Srinivas Shakkottai, Rayadurgam Srikant

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter considers three fundamental problems in the general area of communication networks and their relationship to game theory. These problems are (i) allocation of shared bandwidth resources, (ii) routing across shared links, and (iii) scheduling across shared spectrum. Each problem inherently involves agents that experience negative externalities under which the presence of one degrades the utility perceived by others. Two approaches to solving such problems are (i) to find a globally optimal allocation and simply implement it in a fait accompli fashion, and (ii) request information from the competing agents (traffic flows) and construct a mechanism to allocate resources. Often, only the second option is viable, since a centralized solution using complete information might be impractical (or impossible) with many millions of competing flows, each one having private information about the application that it corresponds to. Hence, a game theoretical analysis of these problems is natural. In what follows, we will present results on each problem and characterize the efficiency loss that results from the mechanism employed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationHandbook of Dynamic Game Theory
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Pages1143-1184
Number of pages42
ISBN (Electronic)9783319443744
ISBN (Print)9783319443737
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 12 2018

Fingerprint

Congestion Control
Communication Networks
Pricing
Routing
Scheduling
Externalities
Resources
Private Information
Optimal Allocation
Game Theory
Traffic Flow
Theoretical Analysis
Bandwidth
Congestion control
Communication networks
Game
Optimal allocation
Complete information
Game theory
Private information

Keywords

  • Communication networks
  • Congestion control
  • Packet scheduling
  • Traffic routing
  • Utility maximization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Shakkottai, S., & Srikant, R. (2018). Communication networks: Pricing, congestion control, routing, and scheduling. In Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory (pp. 1143-1184). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_29

Communication networks : Pricing, congestion control, routing, and scheduling. / Shakkottai, Srinivas; Srikant, Rayadurgam.

Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, 2018. p. 1143-1184.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Shakkottai, S & Srikant, R 2018, Communication networks: Pricing, congestion control, routing, and scheduling. in Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, pp. 1143-1184. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_29
Shakkottai S, Srikant R. Communication networks: Pricing, congestion control, routing, and scheduling. In Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing. 2018. p. 1143-1184 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_29
Shakkottai, Srinivas ; Srikant, Rayadurgam. / Communication networks : Pricing, congestion control, routing, and scheduling. Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, 2018. pp. 1143-1184
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