Abstract
We consider a class of communication games which involves the transmission of a Gaussian random variable through a conditionally Gaussian memoryless channel in the presence of an intelligent jammer. The jammer is allowed to tap the channel and feed a correlated signal back into it. The transmitter-receiver pair is assumed to cooperate in minimizing some quadratic fidelity criterion while the jammer maximizes this same criterion. Security strategies which protect against irrational jammer behavior and which yield an upper bound on the cost are shown to exist for the transmitter-receiver pair over a class of fidelity criteria. Closed-form expressions for these strategies are provided in the paper, which are, in all cases but one, linear in the available information.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 329-346 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 1989 |
Keywords
- Zero-sum games
- communication channels
- jamming problems
- mixed saddle points
- nonclassical information patterns
- statistical decision theory
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Control and Optimization
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Applied Mathematics