TY - GEN
T1 - Collaborative defense against data injection attack in IEC61850 based smart substations
AU - Macwan, Richard
AU - Drew, Christopher
AU - Panumpabi, Prosper
AU - Valdes, Alfonso
AU - Vaidya, Nitin
AU - Sauer, Pete
AU - Ishchenko, Dmitry
PY - 2016/11/10
Y1 - 2016/11/10
N2 - As the power distribution grid moves towards actualizing the concept of a smart grid, the dependence of reliable and secure grid operation on the communication architecture and data is increasing rapidly, along with the possible cyber-attack surface. In this paper first an agreement algorithm for a distribution substation with radial topology is presented that leverages the communication capabilities under the IEC61850 standard, along with basic power system concepts such as Kirchhoff's laws, to detect and locate a data injection attack in the communication system, a relay misconfiguration or a sensor failure that can cause an incorrect response to actual or apparent fault currents. Then a setup for a collaborative mechanism using the algorithm to detect and deter the impacts of such a data injection attack under different grid operating scenarios is introduced. The results of the demonstration of this setup, presented here, show that the proposed collaborative mechanism is consistently able to detect and deter the impacts of data injection and misconfiguration attacks as well as sensor failures in the IEC61850-based smart substation.
AB - As the power distribution grid moves towards actualizing the concept of a smart grid, the dependence of reliable and secure grid operation on the communication architecture and data is increasing rapidly, along with the possible cyber-attack surface. In this paper first an agreement algorithm for a distribution substation with radial topology is presented that leverages the communication capabilities under the IEC61850 standard, along with basic power system concepts such as Kirchhoff's laws, to detect and locate a data injection attack in the communication system, a relay misconfiguration or a sensor failure that can cause an incorrect response to actual or apparent fault currents. Then a setup for a collaborative mechanism using the algorithm to detect and deter the impacts of such a data injection attack under different grid operating scenarios is introduced. The results of the demonstration of this setup, presented here, show that the proposed collaborative mechanism is consistently able to detect and deter the impacts of data injection and misconfiguration attacks as well as sensor failures in the IEC61850-based smart substation.
KW - Data injection
KW - Error-correcting code
KW - Hardware-in-loop
KW - IEC61850
KW - Substation protection
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85001720236&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85001720236&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/PESGM.2016.7741376
DO - 10.1109/PESGM.2016.7741376
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85001720236
T3 - IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
BT - 2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2016
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2016
Y2 - 17 July 2016 through 21 July 2016
ER -