Cognitive radio from hell: Flipping attack on direct-sequence spread spectrum

J. Harshan, Yih-Chun Hu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a strong adversarial attack, referred to as the flipping attack, on Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) systems. In this attack, the attacker, which is appropriately positioned between the transmitter and the receiver, instantaneously flips the transmitted symbols in the air at 50% rate, thereby driving the channel capacity to zero. Unlike the traditional jamming attack, this attack, when perfectly executed, cannot be detected at the receiver using signal-to-noise-ratio measurements. However, this attack necessitates the attacker to perfectly know the realizations of all the channels in the model. We first introduce the consequences of the flipping attack on narrowband frequency-flat channels, and subsequently discuss its feasibility in wideband frequency-selective channels. From the legitimate users' perspective, we present a method to detect this attack and also propose heuristics to improve the error-performance under the attack. We emphasize that future cyber-physical systems that employ DSSS should design transceivers to detect the proposed flipping attack, and then apply appropriate countermeasures.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1-6
Number of pages6
Volume2018-April
ISBN (Electronic)9781538617342
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 8 2018
Event2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018 - Barcelona, Spain
Duration: Apr 15 2018Apr 18 2018

Other

Other2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018
CountrySpain
CityBarcelona
Period4/15/184/18/18

Fingerprint

Channel capacity
Jamming
Cognitive radio
Transceivers
Transmitters
Signal to noise ratio
Air
Cyber Physical System

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Harshan, J., & Hu, Y-C. (2018). Cognitive radio from hell: Flipping attack on direct-sequence spread spectrum. In 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018 (Vol. 2018-April, pp. 1-6). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2018.8376978

Cognitive radio from hell : Flipping attack on direct-sequence spread spectrum. / Harshan, J.; Hu, Yih-Chun.

2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018. Vol. 2018-April Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 1-6.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Harshan, J & Hu, Y-C 2018, Cognitive radio from hell: Flipping attack on direct-sequence spread spectrum. in 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018. vol. 2018-April, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1-6, 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018, Barcelona, Spain, 4/15/18. https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2018.8376978
Harshan J, Hu Y-C. Cognitive radio from hell: Flipping attack on direct-sequence spread spectrum. In 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018. Vol. 2018-April. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 1-6 https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2018.8376978
Harshan, J. ; Hu, Yih-Chun. / Cognitive radio from hell : Flipping attack on direct-sequence spread spectrum. 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018. Vol. 2018-April Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 1-6
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