TY - GEN
T1 - Cognitive radio from hell
T2 - 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018
AU - Harshan, J.
AU - Hu, Yih Chun
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/6/8
Y1 - 2018/6/8
N2 - In this paper, we introduce a strong adversarial attack, referred to as the flipping attack, on Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) systems. In this attack, the attacker, which is appropriately positioned between the transmitter and the receiver, instantaneously flips the transmitted symbols in the air at 50% rate, thereby driving the channel capacity to zero. Unlike the traditional jamming attack, this attack, when perfectly executed, cannot be detected at the receiver using signal-to-noise-ratio measurements. However, this attack necessitates the attacker to perfectly know the realizations of all the channels in the model. We first introduce the consequences of the flipping attack on narrowband frequency-flat channels, and subsequently discuss its feasibility in wideband frequency-selective channels. From the legitimate users' perspective, we present a method to detect this attack and also propose heuristics to improve the error-performance under the attack. We emphasize that future cyber-physical systems that employ DSSS should design transceivers to detect the proposed flipping attack, and then apply appropriate countermeasures.
AB - In this paper, we introduce a strong adversarial attack, referred to as the flipping attack, on Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) systems. In this attack, the attacker, which is appropriately positioned between the transmitter and the receiver, instantaneously flips the transmitted symbols in the air at 50% rate, thereby driving the channel capacity to zero. Unlike the traditional jamming attack, this attack, when perfectly executed, cannot be detected at the receiver using signal-to-noise-ratio measurements. However, this attack necessitates the attacker to perfectly know the realizations of all the channels in the model. We first introduce the consequences of the flipping attack on narrowband frequency-flat channels, and subsequently discuss its feasibility in wideband frequency-selective channels. From the legitimate users' perspective, we present a method to detect this attack and also propose heuristics to improve the error-performance under the attack. We emphasize that future cyber-physical systems that employ DSSS should design transceivers to detect the proposed flipping attack, and then apply appropriate countermeasures.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85049187212&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85049187212&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/WCNC.2018.8376978
DO - 10.1109/WCNC.2018.8376978
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85049187212
T3 - IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC
SP - 1
EP - 6
BT - 2018 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 15 April 2018 through 18 April 2018
ER -