TY - JOUR
T1 - Coalition structure values in differential information economies
T2 - Is unity a strength?
AU - Krasa, Stefan
AU - Temimi, Akram
AU - Yannelis, Nicholas C.
N1 - Temimi acknowledges financial support from the Culverhouse College of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of Alabama.
PY - 2003/2
Y1 - 2003/2
N2 - The coalition structure (CS) value, introduced by Owen [G. Owen, Values of games with a priori unions, in: Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1977] and Hart and Kurz [Econometrica 51 (1983) 1047], generalizes the Shapley value to social situations where coalitions form for the purpose of bargaining. This paper introduces the CS value to economies with differential information. We show that the private CS values exists and is Bayesian incentive compatible. Moreover, we construct examples that go against the intuitive viewpoint that "unity is strength". In particular, we consider a three-person economy in which two agents bargain as a unit against the third agent. We show that bargaining as a unit is advantageous if and only if information is complete. This result sheds new light on bargaining under differential information.
AB - The coalition structure (CS) value, introduced by Owen [G. Owen, Values of games with a priori unions, in: Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1977] and Hart and Kurz [Econometrica 51 (1983) 1047], generalizes the Shapley value to social situations where coalitions form for the purpose of bargaining. This paper introduces the CS value to economies with differential information. We show that the private CS values exists and is Bayesian incentive compatible. Moreover, we construct examples that go against the intuitive viewpoint that "unity is strength". In particular, we consider a three-person economy in which two agents bargain as a unit against the third agent. We show that bargaining as a unit is advantageous if and only if information is complete. This result sheds new light on bargaining under differential information.
KW - Bargaining
KW - Coalition structure value
KW - Differential information economies
KW - Under differential information
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U2 - 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00083-6
DO - 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00083-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0037301489
SN - 0304-4068
VL - 39
SP - 51
EP - 62
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
IS - 1-2
ER -