Abstract
Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 113-135 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
Volume | 127 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2018 |
Keywords
- Capital-gains tax
- Corporate governance
- Lock-in effect
- Mutual fund
- Proxy voting
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management