A major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction - convergence of platforms to the median voter's ideal - is seldom observed. One reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes. Here we associate voters' expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements, and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their 'reputations' are perceived as less risky than challengers. In equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms. Typically neither adopts the median voter's ideal point. Either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent's reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively 'risky' the electorate perceives the challenger to be.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||21|
|Journal||Journal of Public Economics|
|State||Published - Jun 1985|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics