Can charitable appeals identify and exploit belief heterogeneity?

Michalis Drouvelis, Benjamin M. Marx

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Charitable fundraisers frequently announce giving by others, and research shows that this can increase donations. However, this mechanism may not put information about peers to the most efficient use if it is costly to inform individuals who are indifferent to peer actions or causes some individuals to give less. We investigate whether a simple mechanism without incentives can predict heterogeneity in charitable responses to peer decisions. We elicit beliefs about donations in a baseline solicitation, and in subsequent solicitations we randomly assign information about others’ donations. We find that elicited beliefs are often logically inconsistent and that many subjects fail to update beliefs when treated. Elicited beliefs did not predict heterogeneous treatment effects on beliefs or donations, making the strategy unlikely to succeed unless individuals are engaged and the information is salient.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)631-649
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
StatePublished - Jun 2022


  • Charitable
  • Donation
  • Experiment
  • Norm
  • Peer effects
  • Social preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management


Dive into the research topics of 'Can charitable appeals identify and exploit belief heterogeneity?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this