Bureaucratic discretion and contracting outcomes

Matthew Boland; David Godsell

doi:10.1016/j.aos.2020.101173

Bureaucratic discretion and contracting outcomes

Matthew Boland, David Godsell

Accountancy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We find that federal bureaucrats award more, larger, and less risky contracts to politically connected firms when they have greater discretion over contracting outcomes. Using a sample of 4.3 million federal government contract actions obligating $2.47 trillion between 2000 and 2015, we show that this result varies predictably across contract and agency characteristics, over time, and in placebo tests, and is robust to a comprehensive fixed effect structure and seven alternate measures of political connectedness. Our evidence illustrates the overlooked role of the bureaucrat in facilitating political bias in federal contracting outcomes.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	101173
Journal	Accounting, Organizations and Society
Volume	88
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2020.101173
State	Published - Jan 2021

Keywords

Corporate political activity
Government spending
Monitoring and control
Procurement contracts

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Accounting
Sociology and Political Science
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Information Systems and Management

Online availability

10.1016/j.aos.2020.101173

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Bureaucratic discretion and contracting outcomes

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Online availability

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