Design methods for federated systems must consider local incentives and interactive effects among independent decision-makers. This paper extends value-centric design methodology (VCDM) to multi-actor cases using game theoretic principles. Federated systems can be represented as a Stag Hunt game where players choose between risk-dominant (non-cooperative) and payoff-dominant (cooperative) strategies. An independent strategy is a lower bound to federated value and a centralized strategy controlled by a federation authority is an upper bound under special cases. An application case considers a stylized system value model (SVM) of a federated satellite system (FSS) with two players and a tradespace of 530 symmetric design decisions. A federated concept with opportunistic, fixed-cost communication services demonstrates the effect of lower and upper bounds on system value. Risk in federated systems arises from misaligned strategies between players and can be quantitatively assessed with a subjective estimate of cooperation.