@inproceedings{0d941f59a89d4495b8d9ed19ca919764,
title = "BootJacker: Compromising computers using forced restarts",
abstract = "BootJacker is a proof-of-concept attack tool which demonstrates that authentication mechanism', employed by an operating 'ystem can be bypassed by obtaining physical access and simply forcing a restart. The key insight that enables this attack is that the contents of memory on some machines are fully preserved across a warm boot. Upon a reboot, BootJacker uses this residual memory state to revive the original host operating system environment and run malicious payloads. Using BootJacker, an attacker can break into a locked user session and gain access to open encrypted disks, web browser sessions or other secure network connections. BootJacker's non-persistent design makes it possible for an attacker to leave no traces on the victim machine.",
keywords = "Attacks, Memory remanence, Security",
author = "Chan, {Ellick M.} and Carlyle, {Jeffrey C.} and David, {Francis M.} and Reza Farivar and Campbell, {Roy H.}",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1145/1455770.1455840",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781595938107",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security",
pages = "555--564",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'08",
note = "15th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'08 ; Conference date: 27-10-2008 Through 31-10-2008",
}