Board structure, antitakeover provisions, and stockholder wealth

Chamu Sundaramurthy, James M. Mahoney, Joseph T. Mahoney

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper's regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, antigreenmail and poison pills) in the 1984-88 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover provisions vary depending on firms' board structures. This paper's empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increases negative market reactions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)231-245
Number of pages15
JournalStrategic Management Journal
Issue number3
StatePublished - Mar 1997


  • Antitakeover provisions
  • Board leadership
  • Shareholder wealth

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management


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