TY - JOUR
T1 - Blockholder Disclosure Thresholds and Hedge Fund Activism
AU - Ordóñez-Calafi, Guillem
AU - Bernhardt, Dan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington.
PY - 2022/11/30
Y1 - 2022/11/30
N2 - Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist's disciplining of management. Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if the threat of their participation discourages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism can be excessive: If market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining, and society benefits from lower thresholds.
AB - Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist's disciplining of management. Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if the threat of their participation discourages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism can be excessive: If market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining, and society benefits from lower thresholds.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0022109022000059
DO - 10.1017/S0022109022000059
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85124178502
SN - 0022-1090
VL - 57
SP - 2834
EP - 2859
JO - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
JF - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
IS - 7
ER -