Auctions for divisible resources: Price functions, nash equilibrium, and decentralized update schemes

Rajiv T. Maheswaran, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


One of the many emerging applications for software agents are their ability to serve as proxies for trade and bartering. This has led to the analysis and development of auction protocols for various goods. We consider agent-mediated allocation of computational and network resources through market mechanisms. Single-good and combinatorial auctions do not apply readily to these products, thus we propose a divisible auction that is proportionally fair and has low signaling and computational costs. The structure of the auction enables us to represent optimal responses as price functions. From this we are able to characterize agent valuations and prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. We further develop a decentralized algorithm that allows the agents to converge to the operating point without sharing private information.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAgent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV
Subtitle of host publicationDesigning Mechanisms and Systems - AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, Revised Papers
EditorsJulian Padget, Onn Shehory, David Parkes, Norman Sadeh, William E. Walsh
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783540003274
StatePublished - 2002
EventWorkshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, AAMAS 2002 - Bologna, Italy
Duration: Jul 16 2002Jul 16 2002

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


OtherWorkshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, AAMAS 2002

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

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