Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack: A case study for power grid frequency control

Xin Lou, Cuong Tran, Rui Tan, David K.Y. Yau, Zbigniew T. Kalbarczyk

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Recent attacks against cyber-physical systems (CPSes) show that traditional reliance on isolation for security is insufficient. This paper develops efficient assessment and mitigation of an attack’s impact as a system’s built-in mechanisms. We focus on a general class of attacks, which we call time delay attack, that delays the transmissions of control data packets in a linear CPS control system. Our attack impact assessment, which is based on a joint stability-safety criterion, consists of (i) a machine learning (ML) based safety classification, and (ii) a tandem stability-safety classification that exploits a basic relationship between stability and safety, namely that an unstable system must be unsafe whereas a stable system may not be safe. The ML addresses a state explosion problem in the safety classification, whereas the tandem structure reduces false negatives in detecting unsafety arising from imperfect ML. We apply our approach to assess the impact of the attack on power grid automatic generation control, and accordingly develop a two-tiered mitigation that tunes the control gain automatically to restore safety where necessary and shed load only if the tuning is insufficient. Extensive simulations based on a 37-bus system model are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of our assessment and mitigation approaches.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
EditorsGowri Sankar Ramachandran, Jorge Ortiz
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages207-216
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781450362856
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 16 2019
Event10th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, ICCPS 2019, part of the 2019 CPS-IoT Week - Montreal, Canada
Duration: Apr 16 2019Apr 18 2019

Publication series

NameICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems

Conference

Conference10th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, ICCPS 2019, part of the 2019 CPS-IoT Week
CountryCanada
CityMontreal
Period4/16/194/18/19

Fingerprint

Time delay
Learning systems
Linear control systems
Gain control
Explosions
Tuning

Keywords

  • Cyber-physical systems
  • Delay attack
  • Machine learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture

Cite this

Lou, X., Tran, C., Tan, R., Yau, D. K. Y., & Kalbarczyk, Z. T. (2019). Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack: A case study for power grid frequency control. In G. S. Ramachandran, & J. Ortiz (Eds.), ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (pp. 207-216). (ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems). Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/3302509.3311042

Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack : A case study for power grid frequency control. / Lou, Xin; Tran, Cuong; Tan, Rui; Yau, David K.Y.; Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew T.

ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. ed. / Gowri Sankar Ramachandran; Jorge Ortiz. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2019. p. 207-216 (ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Lou, X, Tran, C, Tan, R, Yau, DKY & Kalbarczyk, ZT 2019, Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack: A case study for power grid frequency control. in GS Ramachandran & J Ortiz (eds), ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, pp. 207-216, 10th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, ICCPS 2019, part of the 2019 CPS-IoT Week, Montreal, Canada, 4/16/19. https://doi.org/10.1145/3302509.3311042
Lou X, Tran C, Tan R, Yau DKY, Kalbarczyk ZT. Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack: A case study for power grid frequency control. In Ramachandran GS, Ortiz J, editors, ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. 2019. p. 207-216. (ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems). https://doi.org/10.1145/3302509.3311042
Lou, Xin ; Tran, Cuong ; Tan, Rui ; Yau, David K.Y. ; Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew T. / Assessing and mitigating impact of time delay attack : A case study for power grid frequency control. ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. editor / Gowri Sankar Ramachandran ; Jorge Ortiz. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2019. pp. 207-216 (ICCPS 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems).
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