Are contingent convertibles going-concern capital?

Franco Fiordelisi, George G Pennacchi, Ornella Ricci

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Contingent convertibles (CoCos)are intended to either convert to new equity or be written down prior to failure while a bank is a going-concern. Yet, in the first actual test case, CoCos never converted before its bank failed. We develop a model that predicts that CoCos lead to less (more)extreme stock returns and have yields greater than (similar to)standard subordinated debt yields if investors do (do not)expect them to convert or be written down prior to failure. These predictions are tested using data on CoCos issued by European banks during 2011 to 2017. We find evidence that equity conversion CoCos reduce stock return variance and several other measures of downside risk, consistent with the perception that they are going-concern capital. However, we also provide event study evidence that recent regulatory actions reduced the CoCo–subordinated debt yield spread, which indicates a diminished investor belief that CoCos are going-concern capital.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalJournal of Financial Intermediation
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

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Going concern
Investors
Stock returns
Equity
Subordinated debt
European banks
Yield spread
Downside risk
Prediction
Event study
Debt

Keywords

  • Bank regulation
  • Bank risk
  • Contingent capital

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Are contingent convertibles going-concern capital? / Fiordelisi, Franco; Pennacchi, George G; Ricci, Ornella.

In: Journal of Financial Intermediation, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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