An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management

Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We present a market-based approach to the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) problem. The goods in our market are delays and buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis. We give a notion of equilibrium for this market and an LP whose every optimal solution gives an equilibrium allocation of flights to landing slots as well as equilibrium prices for the landing slots. Via a reduction to matching, we show that this equilibrium can be computed combinatorially in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, there is a special set of equilibrium prices, which can be computed easily, that is identical to the VCG solution, and therefore the market is incentive compatible in dominant strategy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationComputing and Combinatorics - 23rd International Conference, COCOON 2017, Proceedings
EditorsYixin Cao, Jianer Chen
PublisherSpringer
Pages407-419
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9783319623887
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017
Event23rd International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2017 - Hong Kong, China
Duration: Aug 3 2017Aug 5 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10392 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other23rd International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2017
Country/TerritoryChina
CityHong Kong
Period8/3/178/5/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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