An Examination of a Moral Argument against Nuclear Deterrence

Robert McKim

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After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong to do. My conclusion is that there is something to this argument, that it is sufficient to establish a "prima facie" case against nuclear deterrence, but that it is not sufficient to establish a conclusive case against nuclear deterrence.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)279-297
JournalJournal of Religious Ethics
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1985


  • Christian Ethics
  • DETERRENCE (Strategy)
  • MORAL & ethical aspects
  • NUCLEAR disarmament


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