Abstract
After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong to do. My conclusion is that there is something to this argument, that it is sufficient to establish a "prima facie" case against nuclear deterrence, but that it is not sufficient to establish a conclusive case against nuclear deterrence.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 279-297 |
Journal | Journal of Religious Ethics |
Volume | 13 |
Issue number | 2 |
State | Published - 1985 |
Keywords
- Christian Ethics
- DETERRENCE (Strategy)
- MORAL & ethical aspects
- NUCLEAR disarmament