An equilibrium model of quits under optimal contracting

Charles M. Kahn, Stanley D. Longhofer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This article develops an equilibrium model of quits in a labor market and examines the effect of contracting under asymmetric information, when compared with symmetric information and noncontractual base lines. We demonstrate that quits increase in periods of high output, without postulating exogenous price rigidity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1203-1222
Number of pages20
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Issue number6
StatePublished - Aug 1993
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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