An Adam Smithian account of moral reasons

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The Humean Theory of Reasons, according to which all of our reasons for action are explained by our desires, has been criticized for not being able to account for “moral reasons,” namely, overriding reasons to act on moral demands regardless of one's desires. My aim in this paper is to utilize ideas from Adam Smith's moral philosophy in order to offer a novel and alternative account of moral reasons that is both desire-based and accommodating of an adequate version of the requirement that moral demands have overriding reason-giving force. In particular, I argue that the standpoint of what Smith calls “the impartial spectator” can both determine what is morally appropriate and inappropriate and provide the basis for normative reasons for action—including reasons to act on moral demands—to nearly all reason-responsive agents and, furthermore, that these reasons have the correct weight. The upshot of the proposed account is that it offers an interesting middle road out of a dilemma pertaining to the explanatory and normative dimensions of reasons for informed-desire Humean theorists.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalEuropean Journal of Philosophy
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2019

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Moral Reasons
Spectator
Adam Smith
David Hume
Normative Reasons
Reasons for Action
Roads
Moral philosophy
Theorists

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

An Adam Smithian account of moral reasons. / Ben-Moshe, Nir.

In: European Journal of Philosophy, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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