Alternative firm strategies for signaling quality in the food system

Dynamics in the global food system, coupled with rapid advance in agricultural biotechnology, have resulted in additional demands for capturing information and sharing information vertically within the supply chain. Food safety and quality characteristics are a cornerstone of this information demand. Events such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), genetic engineering and animal welfare concerns have laid the foundation for additional information need. Managers of private firms within the food supply chain must decide how to respond to the situation. A crucial component of the problem is what and how to provide information to downstream customers as well as stipulate what and how information is received from upstream suppliers. Alternative signaling mechanisms abound. The choice among these alternative signals, or combination of alternatives, has both short- and long-run implications for the reputation of the firm, its products or services, and the efficiency with which it conducts its business. The signaling problem in the supply chain is bidirectional and has three critical dimensions: information asymmetry, incentive asymmetry, and arduous measurability. From a broad perspective, the choice set for signaling includes: strategies that rely on third-party protocols and procedures; differentiation through branding and reputation; indemnification strategies such as insurance, warranties, and bonding; and coordination strategies such as strategic alliances and vertical integration (internalization). Each mechanism for signaling differentially influences the three dimensions of the signaling problem. No globally optimal strategy solution exists. Differentiation through branding and reputation mitigate the signaling problem relatively well compared with the other alternatives.