Abstract
The article discusses the allocation of regulatory resources in the U.S. as of June 2012, focusing on an analysis of the optimal deterrence factor in relation to the identification of the level of penalties that maximize social welfare. A balancing test which weighs the benefits of a law against the costs associated with enforcing the law is addressed. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's efforts to deter corporate officers from committing securities fraud are also mentioned.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 739-769 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Journal of Corporation Law |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| State | Published - Jun 1 2012 |
Keywords
- GOVERNMENT policy
- MANAGEMENT
- Resource allocation
- Government agencies
- UNITED States
- Deterrence (Administrative law)
- Securities fraud -- United States
- Executives -- Legal status, laws, etc.
- United States
- United States. Securities & Exchange Commission
- optimal deterrence
- regulation
- Budgeting
- case selection
- placebo effect
- bias arbitrage