Abstract
The Maastricht Treaty created the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (ECB) to head the system. The treaty entrusts the ECB with the responsibility for monetary policy, but national authorities remain responsible for financial stability. In this chapter, we focus on the implications of national versus central assignment of lender-of-lastresort and supervisory functions for the degree of forbearance in closing distressed banks and for the level of diligence in bank supervision. One major conclusion is that, if only one of the two functions is centralized, then it will be more effective to centralize the supervisory function.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs |
Subtitle of host publication | Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and Stability |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191601200 |
ISBN (Print) | 0199271402, 9780199271405 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 1 2004 |
Keywords
- Assignment problem
- Banking supervision
- European central bank
- European system of central banks
- Incentive compatibility
- Lender of last resort
- Maastricht treaty
- Regulatory theory
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)