Abstract
Reactive jamming nodes are the nodes of the network that get compromised and become the source of jamming attacks. They assume to know any shared secrets and protocols used in the networks. Thus, they can jam very effectively and are very stealthy. We propose a novel framework for identifying the reactive jamming nodes in wireless LAN (WLAN). We rely on the half-duplex nature of nodes: they cannot transmit and receive at the same time. Thus, if a compromised node jams a packet, it cannot guess the content of the jammed packet. More importantly, if an honest node receives a jammed packet, it can prove that it cannot be the one jamming the packet by showing the content of the packet. Such proofs of jammed packets are called "alibis" - the key concept of our approach. In this paper, we present an alibi framework to deal with reactive jamming nodes in WLAN. We propose a concept of alibi-safe topologies on which our proposed identification algorithms are proved to correctly identify the attackers. We further propose a realistic protocol to implement the identification algorithm. The protocol includes a BBC-based timing channel for information exchange under the jamming situation and a similarity hashing technique to reduce the storage and network overhead. The framework is evaluated in a realistic TOSSIM simulation where the simulation characteristics and parameters are based on real traces on our small-scale MICAz test-bed. The results show that in reasonable dense networks, the alibi framework can accurately identify both non-colluding and colluding reactive jamming nodes.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 1 2011 |
| Event | 54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011 - Houston, TX, United States Duration: Dec 5 2011 → Dec 9 2011 |
Publication series
| Name | GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference |
|---|
Other
| Other | 54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011 |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Houston, TX |
| Period | 12/5/11 → 12/9/11 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cite this
Alibi framework for identifying reactive jamming nodes in wireless LAN. / Nguyen, Hoang; Pongthawornkamol, Thadpong; Nahrstedt, Klara.
2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011. 2011. 6134240 (GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Alibi framework for identifying reactive jamming nodes in wireless LAN
AU - Nguyen, Hoang
AU - Pongthawornkamol, Thadpong
AU - Nahrstedt, Klara
PY - 2011/12/1
Y1 - 2011/12/1
N2 - Reactive jamming nodes are the nodes of the network that get compromised and become the source of jamming attacks. They assume to know any shared secrets and protocols used in the networks. Thus, they can jam very effectively and are very stealthy. We propose a novel framework for identifying the reactive jamming nodes in wireless LAN (WLAN). We rely on the half-duplex nature of nodes: they cannot transmit and receive at the same time. Thus, if a compromised node jams a packet, it cannot guess the content of the jammed packet. More importantly, if an honest node receives a jammed packet, it can prove that it cannot be the one jamming the packet by showing the content of the packet. Such proofs of jammed packets are called "alibis" - the key concept of our approach. In this paper, we present an alibi framework to deal with reactive jamming nodes in WLAN. We propose a concept of alibi-safe topologies on which our proposed identification algorithms are proved to correctly identify the attackers. We further propose a realistic protocol to implement the identification algorithm. The protocol includes a BBC-based timing channel for information exchange under the jamming situation and a similarity hashing technique to reduce the storage and network overhead. The framework is evaluated in a realistic TOSSIM simulation where the simulation characteristics and parameters are based on real traces on our small-scale MICAz test-bed. The results show that in reasonable dense networks, the alibi framework can accurately identify both non-colluding and colluding reactive jamming nodes.
AB - Reactive jamming nodes are the nodes of the network that get compromised and become the source of jamming attacks. They assume to know any shared secrets and protocols used in the networks. Thus, they can jam very effectively and are very stealthy. We propose a novel framework for identifying the reactive jamming nodes in wireless LAN (WLAN). We rely on the half-duplex nature of nodes: they cannot transmit and receive at the same time. Thus, if a compromised node jams a packet, it cannot guess the content of the jammed packet. More importantly, if an honest node receives a jammed packet, it can prove that it cannot be the one jamming the packet by showing the content of the packet. Such proofs of jammed packets are called "alibis" - the key concept of our approach. In this paper, we present an alibi framework to deal with reactive jamming nodes in WLAN. We propose a concept of alibi-safe topologies on which our proposed identification algorithms are proved to correctly identify the attackers. We further propose a realistic protocol to implement the identification algorithm. The protocol includes a BBC-based timing channel for information exchange under the jamming situation and a similarity hashing technique to reduce the storage and network overhead. The framework is evaluated in a realistic TOSSIM simulation where the simulation characteristics and parameters are based on real traces on our small-scale MICAz test-bed. The results show that in reasonable dense networks, the alibi framework can accurately identify both non-colluding and colluding reactive jamming nodes.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84857217988&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84857217988&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134240
DO - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134240
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84857217988
SN - 9781424492688
T3 - GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
BT - 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011
ER -