Agent mobility under price incentives

Rajiv T. Maheswaran, Orhan Cagri Imer, Tamer Basar

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review


We consider a dynamic network with an underlying electronic market structure supporting mobile agents. We propose to use price curves along with utility functions for agents to ensure that the network resources are utilized efficiently. The optimization problem for an agent considering purchase from a single seller with perfect information on the price curve is addressed in some detail, and a necessary condition is obtained for purchasing service. Also, the existence of a unique rate that maximizes the agent's utility is established. Finally, the results of the single seller optimization problem are extended to the cases where there are multiple sellers, with possibly imperfect information on the price curves of each.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)4020-4025
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
StatePublished - 1999
EventThe 38th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) - Phoenix, AZ, USA
Duration: Dec 7 1999Dec 10 1999

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization


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